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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOEL SCOTT McNEARNEY, : Case No. 20030548-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's claim, this Court should reach McNearney's argument 
because it is properly preserved for appeal, is ripe, and is not moot. Moreover, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by granting the State's general 
prosecutorial discovery and the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF McNEARNEY'S 
ARGUMENT BECAUSE IT IS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
On appeal, McNearney asserts that this Court should reverse because the trial 
court's order granting general prosecutorial discovery violated the work-product 
doctrine, due process, his right against self-incrimination, his right to full representation 
of counsel, and the attorney-client privilege. See Aplt Br. at 18. In response, the State 
claims that none of McNearney's arguments were preserved for appeal.1 See Aple. Br. at 
15, 17, 20, 22, 23. The preservation requirement exists because "the trial court ought to 
be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and Ma 
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 
enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. . . 
claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,^11, 
10 P.3d 346 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Accordingly, an 
issue is properly preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded 
an opportunity to rule on the issue."5" Hart v. Salt Lake County ComnTn. 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted); Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT 
App 239,^[26, 8 P.3d 281 (holding "party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is 
brought 'to a "level of consciousness"5" (citations omitted)); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection timely because he "met the 
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial 
1
 To support its argument, the State cites State v. Dean. 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276, 
and Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, 73 P.3d 334, cert, denied. 124 S. Ct. 
826 (2003). Neither of these cases are instructive. First, in Dean, the appellant conceded 
the issue was not preserved for appeal and instead argued plain error. Dean, 2004 UT 63 
at ^|6. Consequently, our supreme court had no reason to carefully consider preservation. 
Id. at TJ14. Besides, the appellant obviously did not preserve his issue below because he 
simply claimed "there were 'two significant departures' from due process and equal 
protection," and never indicated "what those departures were." IcL Second, in Haltom, 
our supreme court discussed the requirements for adequate briefing, not preservation. 
Haltom, 2003 UT 26 at Hf74-75. 
2 
court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, McNearney's arguments are properly preserved for appeal. See 
Addendum A. First, McNearney preserved his argument that the prosecutorial discovery 
order violated the work-product doctrine. At the motion hearing, McNearney objected to 
the State's motion for discovery because "[a]ll the information they want is . . . work 
product," and explained that State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 75, 21 P.3d 675, does not 
uaddress[].. . work product/' R. 214:3-4, 9. In its order, the trial court considered 
"work product" and attempted to protect it by excluding "opinions, impressions or that 
kind of thing" from its order to produce witness statements. LcL at 10, 13-14. Despite 
this discussion, the State argues McNearney ?s argument is not preserved because he did 
not "further object" after the trial court excluded "opinions, impressions or that kind of 
thing" from its order. Aple. Br. at 15. However, Utah courts do "not require a party to 
continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a 
decision on the issue." State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,1(14, 20 P.3d 265.2 
2
 See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114,1(20, 61 P.3d 1062 (holding "'defendant [is 
not required] to object or to renew his motion to suppress at trial where the trial judge is 
also the judge who ruled on the pretrial motion'" (citation omitted)); J.W. v. State, 2001 
UT App 208,1(15 n. 4, 30 P.3d 1232 (holding sufficiency argument preserved because 
both parties argued evidence during closing, trial court made finding, and "any farther 
objections or motions regarding this issue would have been futile"); Ikon Office 
Solutions. Inc. v. Crook. 2000 UT App 217,1(14, 6 P.3d 1143 (holding no need for party 
to move to dissolve where "it would have been duplicative, costly, and probably futile"); 
cf State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,1(34, 989 P.2d 52 ("'"The failure of counsel to make 
motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
assistance."'" (citations omitted)). 
3 
Second, McNearney preserved his argument that the prosecutorial order violated 
due process. On appeal, McNearney argues the prosecutorial discovery order violated 
due process because it was sloped in the State's favor rather than sloped in his favor or, 
at the very least, reciprocal. See Aplt. Br. at 24-26. Below, McNearney specifically 
discussed reciprocity and highlighted minutes from the 1993 and 1994 Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure committee meetings where the committee specifically rejected an 
amendment to rule 16 that would have created reciprocal discovery and outlined the 
information "to be disclosed." R. 214:3, 7-8. He further explained: 
The bottom line is that this system is not designed to be a 
level playing field and it never has been. That is the reason 
that the State carries the tremendous burden of proof, is 
because they're attempting, through their resources, through 
their investigators, through the prosecution, through all these 
things that they have access to, to take away someone's 
liberty. And as a result of that, their burden should be high 
and I should not be required to assist in that endeavor. 
Id. at 4-5. In its ruling, the trial court discussed "fairness" and agreed prosecutorial 
discovery should be "balanced in a way that doesn't interfere with the Constitutional 
rights." Id, at 10. Specifically, the State argues McNearney did not preserve his 
argument that "prosecution discovery may not be ordered until defense discovery is 
completed and/or that the actual items disclosed by the prosecution must exceed those 
actually disclosed by the defense." Aple. Br. at 20. This argument, however, is 
necessarily included in McNearney's reciprocity argument and was preserved by 
McNeamey's argument that discovery in criminal cases is not a "level playing field" and 
4 
should not be applied as if the parties are "on equal footing." R. 214:10; cf. State v. 
Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,^25 n. 4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing identity issue even 
though not specifically preserved because defendant preserved probable cause issue and 
"State bears the burden of proving" articulable suspicion (including identity) within 
probable cause issue). 
Third, McNearney preserved his argument that the prosecutorial order violated his 
right against self-incrimination. The State does not explain why it believes this issue is 
not preserved. Aple. Br. at 20; see State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(declaring issue inadequately briefed when "overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). Besides, concern 
for the right against self-incrimination permeated the discussion below. R. 214:3-15. 
Specifically, defense counsel argued, "McNearney has no burden to prove his innocence, 
he's presumed innocent unless the State can prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" 
and explained she was not "at liberty to disclose" the information requested because it 
was all information "I've gained through the representation of my client." Id. at 3-4. In 
other words, revealing the information would place in the State's possession 
McNearney's personal revelations to his counsel. Id. The trial court actively participated 
in defense counsel's argument and ultimately acknowledged prosecutorial discovery 
must be "balanced in a way that doesn't interfere with the Constitutional rights" of 
McNearney. Id. at 10. 
5 
Fourth, McNearney preserved his argument that the prosecutorial discovery order 
violated his right to full representation of counsel. Below, defense counsel argued 
repeatedly that she "should not be required to assist in [the State's] endeavor" because 
"requiring me to turn over this information to the State, makes me a prosecutor on this 
case against my own client." IdL at 3-5. She further explained, "All the information they 
want is information I've gained through the representation of my client, work product, 
privileged information, it's something I don't feel that I'm at liberty to disclose, number 
one. I think that Constitutionally, I can't." Id. at 4. Specifically, the State argues 
McNearney did not preserve one aspect of his argument, that the "trial court must 
examine any discovery supplied by the defense and excise any inculpatory portions," 
because he did not raise it below. Aple. Br. at 22. However, this aspect of McNearney's 
argument is necessarily included in his discussion of self-incrimination and full 
representation. Of Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at f25 n. 4 (addressing identity issue 
even though not specifically preserved because defendant preserved probable cause issue 
and "State bears the burden of proving" articulable suspicion (including identity) within 
probable cause issue). 
Fifth, McNearney preserved his argument that the prosecutorial order violated the 
attorney-client privilege. The State does not explain why it believes this issue is not 
preserved. Aple. Br. at 20; see Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (declaring issue inadequately 
briefed when "overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research 
6 
and argument to the reviewing court"). Besides, this issue is preserved. Below, defense 
counsel argued, "All the information they want is information I've gained through the 
representation of my client,... privileged information, it's something I don't feel that 
I'm at liberty to disclose." R. 214:3-4. Then, in its order, the trial court referenced 
defense counsel's argument and stated the arguments were "all good issues tha t . . . do 
have to be balanced in a way that doesn't interfere with the Constitutional rights and with 
work product. I agree with that." Id. at 10. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF McNEARNEY'S 
ARGUMENT BECAUSE IT IS RIPE AND IS NOT MOOT 
For an issue to be considered on appeal, it must be ripe and must not be moot. 
State v. Vicente, 2004 UT 69%59 84 P.3d 1191. An issue is ripe if the conflict has 
"sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the 
parties thereto." Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake County Common. 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 
(Utah 1981). In other words, "[w]here there exists no more than a difference of opinion 
regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of legislation to a situation in which the 
parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for 
adjudication." Id An issue is moot if "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants." Vicente, 2004 UT 6 at^|3 (citation omitted). In this case, each of 
McNearney's issues are suitable for appeal. 
First, McNearney's argument that the prosecutorial discovery order violated the 
work-product doctrine is proper for adjudication. The State argues this issue is unripe or 
7 
moot because McNearney "never asserted the privilege in connection with a specific 
document and no documents subject to the privilege exist here." Aple. Br. at 18. 
McNearney, however, asserted the work-product doctrine applied to M[a]ll the 
information" requested by the State. R. 214:3-4. This included the witness list created 
by defense counsel that named Barbara Newell (Newell) as a key defense witness. R. 
133-34; 214:10-12; see Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources Corp.. 801 P.2d 
909, 910 (Utah 1990) (listing requirements of work product doctrine: "(1) the material 
must consist of documents or tangible things, (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
for trial, (3) by or for another party or by or for that party's representative"). 
Second, McNearney's argument that the prosecutorial discovery order violated 
due process is proper for adjudication. The State argues this issue is unripe or moot 
because the parties "were both ordered to disclose their trial witnesses." Aple. Br. at 20. 
Regardless, the trial court made its ruling without any consideration of whether the 
prosecutorial discovery order was slanted in McNearney's favor or, at the very least, 
reciprocal. R. 133, 214:10-15: see State v. Mickelsom 848 P.2d 677, 688 n.15 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (noting that "when the field is not level it is because it is purposely sloped in 
the defendant's favor"). Thus, the trial court's order, as a whole, violated due process. 
Id. This violation, in turn, hampered McNearney's defense by forcing him to forego 
preparation rather than chance uncovering discoverable information helpful to the State. 
See supra Part IV. 
8 
Third, McNearney 5s argument that the prosecutorial discovery order violated 
McNearney's right against self-incrimination is proper for adjudication. The State claims 
this issue "is not ripe" because the discovery order did not compel McNearney to disclose 
evidence not intended for trial. Aple. Br. at 21-22. McNearney, however, does not argue 
that his right against self-incrimination was violated because he was compelled to 
disclose evidence he did not intend to use at trial. Aplt. Am. Br. at 27-39. Rather, 
McNearney argues his state right against self-incrimination was violated because the 
Utah Constitution prohibits all prosecutorial discovery, and his federal right against self-
incrimination was violated because the evidence he was compelled to disclose contained 
incriminatory information that should have been protected against discovery. Id. 
Fourth, McNearney ?s argument that the prosecutorial discovery order violated 
McNearney *s right to foil representation of counsel is proper for adjudication. The State 
argues this issue is not ripe because McNearney's argument is based on "speculation and 
not the facts of this case." Aple. Br. at 22. The record, however, amply supports 
McNearney's argument. The trial court ordered blanket discovery of every witness 
statement defense counsel took from witnesses McNearney had a "good faith intent to 
call" at trial. R. 214:11-12. This placed defense counsel in a bind. IcL_ On one hand, 
defense counsel was obligated to zealously represent McNearney by folly preparing for 
trial. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 Comment ("A lawyer should act with commitment 
and dedication to the interest of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's 
9 
behalf"); State v. Melvins. 382 A.2d 925, 927 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (holding 
right to full representation "means providing the defendant with those necessary tools, 
such as investigative support and expert analysis that he needs to carry on his defense"). 
On the other hand, defense counsel was obligated to wholly reveal all statements she 
took from defense witnesses. R. 214:11-12. Thus, defense counsel may have been 
forced to circumscribe her preparation to avoid "a potentially crippling revelation to the 
State of information discovered in the course of investigation." State v. Mingo , 392 A.2d 
590, 592 (NJ. 1978). The potential "chilling effect" on the defense investigation denied 
McNearney full representation of counsel. State v. Williams, 404 A.2d 34, 37 (NJ. 
1979). 
Fifth, McNearney's argument that the prosecutorial discovery order violated the 
attorney-client privilege is proper for adjudication. The State claims, without 
explanation, that this issue is "not ripe." Aple. Br. at 23; see. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 
(declaring issue inadequately briefed when "overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). Regardless, this 
argument is ripe for adjudication. The trial court ordered defense counsel to disclose all 
defense witnesses and existing witness statements for those witnesses. R. 214:10-15. In 
response, defense counsel disclosed the witness list she compiled from McNearney's 
confidential communications to her. See Utah R. Evid. 504(b) ("A client has a privilege 
to . . . prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications."); Utah R. 
10 
Prof. Conduct 1.6(a) (MA lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of 
a client.. . unless the client consents after consultation."). Thus, the trial court's order 
forced defense counsel to disclose privileged material to the State, making review of the 
trial court's order a proper issue on appeal. See. Redwood Gym, 624 P.2d at 1148 
(holding issue is ripe if conflict has "sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal 
rights and obligations between the parties thereto"). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE 
STATE'S REQUEST FOR GENERAL DISCOVERY 
First, the State agrees prosecutorial discovery in Utah is governed by rule 16 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Aple. Br. at 10. Rule 16 says: 
Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense 
shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required 
by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c). 
The State agrees also that M[t]he majority of jurisdictions permit limited 
prosecution discovery of defense evidence." Aple. Br. at 11-12 (citing 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 20.5 (2d Ed. 1999) (hereinafter 
LaFave)). In making this statement, the State implies that rule 16(c) is among this 
majority. Id Even the LaFave text cited by the State, however, singles out rule 16(c) as 
allowing uniquely broad prosecutorial discovery. See LaFave §20.5(a) at 916 n. 7 
11 
(1999); LaFave §20.5(a) at 146 (Supp. 2004) (noting "all but a handful of jurisdictions 
now rely on fairly detailed statutes or court rules to define the permissible scope of 
prosecution discovery," but highlighting Spry as rare example of "open-ended 
provision"). Thus, because prosecutorial discovery presents so many constitutional 
pitfalls and rule 16(c) is unique in its complete lack of guidance, this Court should 
decline to permit prosecutorial discovery until the rules committee or legislature amends 
rule 16(c) to provide specific guidance. See Aplt. Am. Br. at 16 n. 2; see LaFave 
§20.5(a) at 916 (noting that in most jurisdictions, "[t]he failure of the state's discovery 
provisions to specifically authorize a particular type of disclosure is taken as indicating 
the draftsmen did not intend to allow7 the prosecution such discovery"). 
Second, the State argues rule 16(c) "clearly states that a trial court maty, for good 
cause, order the disclosure of defense evidence 'except as . . . privileged,'" and the trial 
court in this case "correctly recognized this limitation." Aple. Br. at 15 (citation 
omitted). In other words, the State argues the trial court applied each of McNearney's 
constitutional privileges and rights to its prosecutorial discovery order. I<L_ The record, 
however, belies this argument. R. 214:10-12. The trial court agreed with defense 
counsel's arguments, noting "I think those . . . are all good issues tha t . . . do have to be 
balanced in a way that doesn't interfere with the Constitutional rights and with work 
product. I agree with that." IcL at 10. But the trial court ruled that it was bound by "the 
Spry case," which says "the only showing that needs to be made [] is materiality. And 
12 
that's made once we're talking about the intention to call at trial." Id. Thus, while the 
trial court agreed that defense counsel raised important issues, it concluded these issues 
were inherently protected by the Spry materiality test. Id This conclusion, however, is 
error. Aplt. Am. Br. at 17-18. In Spry, the defendant challenged a prosecutorial 
discovery order, but raised no privilege or constitutional issues. Spry, 2001 UT App 75 
at lfl[6-7; see Aplt. Am. Br. at Addendum E. Thus, in a case where constitutional and 
privilege challenges are raised, as in this case, the materiality test outlined in Spry is not 
sufficient. Spry, 2001 UT App 75 at ffl[23 n. 6, 25 (noting privileges are "paramount to 
Rule 16(c)"). Rather, a trial court must carefully and individually analyze the discovery 
request in light of each privilege and right asserted. Id_ 
Third, the State summarizes McNearney's argument on appeal as follows: "On 
appeal, defendant does not claim that the order of discovery failed to comply with 
existing Utah law. Instead, he asks this Court to find existing Utah law 
unconstitutional." Aple. Br. at 14-15. This, however, is an inaccurate summary of 
McNearney's argument. McNearney argues rule 16(c) is unconstitutional because it 
violates the right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Aplt. 
Am. Br. at 33-39. He also argues this Court should refuse to enforce rule 16(c) until the 
rules committee or the legislature amends it to provide specific guidance on prosecutorial 
discovery. Aplt. Am. Br. at 16 n. 2; see supra Part III. But McNearney also argues that 
the prosecutorial discovery order violated existing Utah law because the trial court, when 
13 
making its ruling, simply applied the Spry materiality test without ensuring the order 
adequately protected the work-product doctrine, the right to due process, the right against 
self-incrimination, the right to full representation of counsel, and the attorney-client 
privilege. See Aplt Am. Br. at 18. 
Fourth, the State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the 
State's discovery request. Aple. Br. at 16-23. The trial court, however, abused its 
discretion because its order violated: (A) the work-product doctrine, (B) the right to due 
process of law, (C) the right against self-incrimination, (D) the right to full representation 
of counsel, and (E) the attorney-client privilege. 
A, The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated the Work-Product Doctrine. 
First, the State argues the trial court's order was "narrowly limited to trial 
witnesses." Aple. Br. at 17. The record shows the trial court ordered McNearney to 
reveal all witnesses and witness statements except those "you would not call unless 
testimony goes in . . . alternative directs that you can't anticipate at this poinl." R. 
214:12-13. Thus, the trial court's order actually required McNearney not just to reveal 
those witnesses he intended to call but all witnesses except those reserved to rebut a very 
unusual case-in-chief. IcL. Regardless, the work-product doctrine does not just protect 
documents not intended for admission at trial, but all "documents or tangible things . . . 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for t r ia l . . . by or for another party or by or for 
that party's representative." Gold Standard. 801 P.2d at 910. 
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Second, the State notes the trial court "specifically exempted the investigative 
reports from discovery because the defense investigator was not a witness." Aple. Br. at 
17. However, the trial court expressly included investigative reports of witness 
statements for all witnesses on the witness list. R. 214:13-14. Thus, defense counsel's 
representation may have been curtailed because she was forced to circumscribe her 
preparation of McNearney 5s case to avoid "a potentially crippling revelation to the State 
of information discovered in the course of investigation." Mingo , 392 A.2d at 592; see 
Aplt. Am. Br. at 40-41; supra Part IV. 
Third, the State argues the work-product privilege was waived when Newell 
approached the prosecutor. Aple. Br. at 13. Although Newell did approach the 
prosecutor, she did not disclose to the prosecutor her status as McNearney's key witness 
or the contents of her testimony. R. 231:175-76. The prosecutor only knew NewelPs 
importance to the defense case because the trial court ordered McNearney to disclose this 
information. Id Thus, absent the trial court's violation of the work-product doctrine, the 
State would not have known to listen carefully to NewelPs pre-trial disclosures and 
research her past. IcL 
B. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated Due Process. 
The State agrees with McNearney's general discussion of due process, but argues 
due process merely "requires that the defense have the same opportunity for discovery as 
the prosecution." Aple. Br. at 19 (emphasis in original). Regardless of the accuracy of 
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this statement, the trial court's order in this case violated due process because 
McNearney did not even have the opportunity for reciprocal discovery. The trial court 
ordered prosecutorial discovery without any consideration of reciprocity. R. 214:10-15. 
Under this discovery order, McNearney was required to disclose all trial witnesses and 
any accompanying witness statements created during defense counsel's investigation. I<L 
Conversely, the State was only required to produce witness statements recorded in police 
reports, which are not the product of the prosecutor's legal representation and do not 
reveal the prosecutor's investigatory strategy. R. 18-19; 86-97; 214:14-15. Thus, 
defense counsel's representation may have been curtailed because she was forced to 
circumscribe her preparation to avoid discovery of her trial strategy through disclosure of 
her interviewing technique and its revelations. See Melvins. 382 A.2d at 929 (holding 
counsel "must have the opportunity to test confidentially various defense strategies, free 
from the apprehension of having to furnish the State with incriminating information."). 
However, the State was not ordered to reciprocally disclose its trial strategy. R. 18-19; 
86-97; 214:14-15. 
C. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated McNearney9s Right Against 
Self-incrimination. 
The State argues the prosecutorial discovery order did not violate his right against 
self-incrimination because the State "knew about Newell and the threats months before 
the May discovery order because Newell chose to voluntarily make those disclosures." 
Aple. Br. at 20. The Fifth Amendment violation, however, was not in Newell talking to 
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the prosecutor but in McNearney being required to disclose Newell as his key defense 
witness, thereby signaling to the State that it should pay careful attention to Newell's 
statements and research her past. See Prudhomme v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 466 P.2d 673, 674 (Cal. 1970) ("It requires no great effort or imagination to 
conceive of a variety of situations wherein the disclosure of the expected testimony of 
defense witnesses, or even their names and addresses, could easily provide an essential 
link in a chain of evidence underlying the prosecution's case in chief."), superceded by 
electorate initiative, Cal. Const. Art. I, sec. 30, subd. (c) (1990); Aplt. Am. Br. at 27-32. 
Similarly, the Utah Constitution violation was not in Newell talking to the State 
but in rule 16(c) permitting prosecutorial discovery at all. See Utah Const. Art. I, sec. 12 
("The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."). The Utah 
Constitution "should be construed in light of their framers' intent" and the "underlying 
policy considerations." American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (Utah 
1985). Because the common law strictly prohibited prosecutorial discovery and the 
investigative inequities between the prosecution and defense that existed at common law 
still exist today, this Court should interpret the Utah Constitution to prohibit general 
prosecutorial discovery. See Aplt. Am. Br. at 33-39; Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 
475 n. 9 (1973) (recognizing prosecution has "greater financial and staff resources" and 
listing prosecution's tactical advantages); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 
1974) (noting common law prohibited prosecutorial discovery); Prudhomme. 466 P.2d at 
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678 (Peters, J., concurring) ("Discovery is not a 'two-way street' because of the 
constitutional rights of defendants not accorded the prosecution.1'); Jones v. Superior 
Court of Nevada County. 372 P.2d 919, 924 (Cal. 1962) (Peters, J., dissenting) ("The 
simple fact is that our system of criminal procedure is founded upon the principle that the 
ascertainment of the facts is a 'one-way street.5 It is the constitutional right of the 
defendant, who is presumed to be innocent, to stand silent while the state attempts to 
meet its burden of proof.").3 
D. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated McNearney's Right to Full 
Representation of Counsel. 
Aside from its arguments about preservation and mootness, the State has provided 
no further opposition to McNearney's argument that the prosecutorial discovery order 
violated his right to full representation of counsel. Aple. Br. at 22. Thus, because 
McNearney's argument is properly preserved and suitable for adjudication, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court's order violated McNearney's right to full 
representation of counsel. See. Aplt. Am. Br. at 39-43; supra Parts I, II. 
3
 In passing, the State cites State v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359, 370-71 (Utah 1995), 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1049 (1999), for the proposition that "the state and federal 
protections against self-incrimination are co-extensive.11 Aple. Br. at 21. In Herrera, our 
supreme court held that the type of evidence protected by "Utah's privilege against self-
incrimination does not exceed that of the federal constitution." Herrera, 895 P.2d at 371. 
In other words, the Utah Constitution, like the federal constitution, limits the type of 
evidence protected by the right against self-incrimination to "evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature." Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1075. Utah courts have not addressed 
how Utah's right against self-incrimination affects prosecutorial discovery. See. Aplt. 
Am. Br. at 33. 
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E. The Prosecutorial Discovery Order Violated the Attorney-Client Privilege. 
First, the State argues McNearney ?s witness list and accompanying witness 
statements were not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the witness' 
"information was never confidential" since McNearney intended to call the witnesses at 
trial. Aple. Br. at 23. However, privileged material does not lose its privileged status 
merely because its substance will be revealed at trial. The purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege is not to create secrets that can never be revealed, but to "encourage candor 
between attorney and client" so that the client will receive the "best possible 
representation." See Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74,^7, 984 P.2d 980. 
Second, the State argues McNearney 5s witness list was not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege because "Newell voluntarily disclosed [information] to the 
prosecutor." Aple. Br. at 23 (citing Utah R. Evid. 507(a)). Rule 507(a) says: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against 
disclosure of the confidential matter or communication 
waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while 
holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to the 
disclosure of any significant part of the matter or 
communication, or fails to take reasonable precautions 
against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does not apply if the 
disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
Utah R. Evid. 507(a). Newell did not disclose to the State that she was the key defense 
witness. R. 231:175-80. This information was communicated only between McNearney 
and defense counsel. R. 214:10-12. Thus, this information was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and should have been protected from discovery. See Utah R. 
19 
Evid. 504(b) ("A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose . . . confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client between the client and the client's representatives."). 
Third, the State argues McNearney had no reason to fear that the prosecution 
would "unfairly incorporate the divulged information into the State's case-in-chieff 
because the prosecution "twice objected to the admission of Newell's testimony as 
irrelevant." Aple. Br. at 23. However, the problem is not that the State ultimately 
decided Newell's testimony was irrelevant. R. 231:16-21,159. The problem is that the 
State's discovery of McNearney's witness list enabled it to make this decision. R. 214:4. 
The witness list was a direct product of McNearney's private disclosures and defense 
counsel's advice. IdL It was created specifically to assist in McNearney's defense and 
was not intended to assist the prosecution. Id. Thus, the trial court should not have 
permitted discovery of the witness list. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 Comment (requiring 
lawyer to "maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation" so client 
is "encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer"). 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL 
First, the State argues this Court should not presume prejudice because 
"[established law is to the contrary." Aple. Br. at 23. To support this argument, the 
State cites State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that 
"discovery error justifies reversal only if reasonable likelihood of different result." IJL at 
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23-24. However, Knight addresses only how rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure affects "nondisclosures by the prosecution." Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (noting 
rule 30 says "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded"). Rule 30 does not apply to cases 
where a defendant's fundamental right to fall representation of counsel is thwarted by a 
general prosecutorial discovery order. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 
(1942) (reversing without prejudice inquiry because "the right to have the assistance of 
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as 
to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial"), superceded by statute on other 
grounds, Bouriailv v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987); Scott, 519 P.2d at 785-87 
(reversing without addressing prejudice because the general discovery order violated the 
defendant's "fundamental constitutional right" against self-incrimination). Rather, if a 
general prosecutorial discovery order denies a defendant fall representation of counsel, 
an appellate court should presume prejudice. See State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106,^15 n. 2, 
61 P.3d 1019 (holding prejudice must be presumed where defendant suffers "a complete 
deprivation of the right to counsel"); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) ("The right to counsel has been well guarded by the courts as a fundamental 
constitutional right, and the Supreme Court cases have expressed 'that the help of a 
lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial.5" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, the trial court's discovery order potentially hampered McNearney's 
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defense by forcing defense counsel to circumscribe her trial preparation to avoid "a 
potentially crippling revelation to the State of information discovered in the course of 
investigation." Mingo, 392 A.2d at 592. This result may have hindered defense counsel 
in her obligation to zealously represent McNearney. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 
Comment ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interest of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); Melvins, 382 A.2d at 927 
(holding right to full representation "means providing the defendant with those necessary 
tools, such as investigative support and expert analysis that he needs to carry on his 
defense"). It also may have produced a "chilling effect" on the defense investigation that 
denied McNearney full representation of counsel. Williams, 404 A.2d at 37; see 
Melvins, 382 A.2d at 927 (holding "there should be no restriction upon the function of 
counsel in defending a person charged with a crime" because "[w]hen the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is impeded, a criminal proceeding is infected with the 
clear danger of convicting the innocent- a conviction which cannot be permitted to 
stand." (citations omitted)). 
Second, the State argues that if this Court does not to presume prejudice it should 
affirm because McNearney was not actually prejudiced. Aple. Br. at 24. However, 
McNearney was prejudiced by the trial court's prosecutorial discovery order. First, as 
discussed above, he was prevented from enjoying his right to full representation of 
counsel because defense counsel's investigation was impeded by the fear of being forced 
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to reveal "potentially crippling revelation[s] to the State of information discovered in the 
course of investigation." Mingo, 392 A.2d at 592. Second, McNearney was forced to 
reveal Newell was the key defense witness. See. Aplt. Am. Br. at 46-47; R. 214:10-12. 
Based on this discovery, the State was prepared to impeach Newell based on her criminal 
history and the statements she had previously made to the prosecutor. Aplt. Am. Br. at 
47; R. 231:175-80; see In re Misener. 698 P.2d 637, 647 (Cal. 1985) ("[A] defendant 
suffers prejudice by association when a defense witness is impeached by evidence of 
prior convictions."), superceded by electorate initiative, Cal. Const Art. I, sec. 30. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse McNearney 5s conviction because the trial court abused 
its discretion by granting the State's request for general pretrial discovery. 
SUBMITTED this 3^ day of November, 2004. 
K5RT J. SEPPf 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Case No. 0311000035 
MOTION 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOEL SCOTT MCNEARNEY, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of May, 
2003, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the HONORABLE STEPHEN ROTH, sitting as Judge in 
the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and 
that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
CARA M. TANGARO 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
2001 South State, #S-3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BHAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 64107 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 MS. TANGARO: Judge, if we can call the Joel 
4 McNearney matters. 
5 THE COURT: Are you Joel Scott McNearney? 
6 MR. MCNEARNEY: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. McNearney. 
8 MS. TANGARO: Judge, this matter is set today for a 
9 final pre-trial. If I can approach, I have a copy of my jury 
10 instructions and jury questions for the Court. 
11 THE COURT: Which— 
12 MS. TANGARO: I'm sorry. 
13 THE COURT: Which case is being tried? 
14 MS. TANGARO: It's case ending in 035. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. It's the burglary— 
16 MS. TANGARO: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: —and robbery case. 
18 Okay. Now, I remember, got back to this. 
19 Okay. 
20 MS. TANGARO: May I approach as well? 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 MS. TANGARO: (Inaudible) jury instructions. Here's 
23 our motion for discovery (inaudible) discovery in this case. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Okay. I've received the 
25 motion for discovery. Do you have any objection to that? 
1 MS. ROMERO: I do, your Honor. If I can just put 
2 that on the record, and if I can approach, I do have some 
3 documents I've provided to Ms. Tangaro as relayed to the 
4 advisory committee for the Rule 16, as well as the Utah Rules 
5 of Criminal Procedure, but there's Rule 16, that's—there's 
6 references in there to Rule 16 specifically. 
7 One of the problems I have with the State's motion 
8 is that the issue of reciprocal discovery has been discussed, 
9 debated at length by the rules committee. There have been 
10 proposals made to the Supreme Court proposing reciprocal 
11 discovery and those have been in fact rejected. And I think 
12 some of those documents will demonstrate that and I can get 
13 some more current documents for the Court if you'd like those. 
14 But there have been efforts, I think, made, to make 
15 that a formal requirement, that we do have reciprocal 
16 discovery and essentially, our court has opted to reject that 
17 by not incorporating that into the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
18 under Rule 16. 
19 The problems that I have with it specifically is 
20 that the State should not go forward to trial on a case that 
21 they don't believe they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
22 If I present any case whatsoever, it depends specifically on 
23 what the State repr—presents and represents at trial. I 
24 don't really know until after they present their evidence what 
25 I'm going to present. I don't have any idea. My case is 
1 purely a rebuttal case, it is not a case in chief. I have 
2 absolutely no burden to present to the Court, to the jury, to 
3 anybody else. Mr. McNearney has no burden to prove his 
4 innocence, he's presumed innocent unless the State can prove 
5 him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
6 The State has a very heavy burden and as well they 
7 should, in order to convict somebody and to take away their 
8 liberty, they should have a tremendous burden of proof and 
9 essentially, by requiring me to turn over this information to 
10 the State, makes me a prosecutor on this case against my own 
11 client. 
12 All the information they want is information I've 
13 gained through the representation of my client, work product, 
14 privileged information, it's something I don't feel that I'm 
15 at liberty to disclose, number one. I think that 
16 Constitutionally, I can't. 
17 Number two, again, I think this is an instance, the 
18 State says in its motion, good cause exists in this case 
19 because first, if the defense has truly exculpatory evidence, 
20 the prosecution can be dealt or dismissed accordingly. 
21 Obviously, if there was anything that this—the 
22 defense was going to present that was going to lead to 
23 dismissal of charges, that would have done a long time—would 
24 have been done a long time ago and probably something the 
25 State would have discovered at the preliminary hearing. I 
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don't really think that's good cause, I think they can make 
that argument in every case. 
And I think when you're talking about good cause, I 
think you need something more than just a standard, run-of-
the-mill argument that we want this information. 
Moreover, the State says secondly, if the defense 
evidence is flawed, the prosecution, just like the defense, 
should be permitted to investigate such flaws and reveal them 
at trial. 
The bottom line is that this system is not designed 
to be a level playing field and it never has been* That is 
the reason that the State carries the tremendous burden of 
proof, is because they're attempting, through their resources, 
through their investigators, through the prosecution, through 
all these things that they have access to, to take away 
someone's liberty. And as a result of that, their burden 
should be high and I should not be required to assist in that 
endeavor. 
The third—third basis the State makes is disclosure 
is necessary for proper presentation of the State's case. 
Again, my position is, the State should not be going to trial 
on cases that they're not ready to go forward on, that they 
don't have proof beyond a reasonable doubt on. It's their 
burden, it's not my burden. 
THE COURT: I understand that. 
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1 Okay. Ms. Tangaro? 
2 MS. TANGARO: Your Honor, just briefly. I think 
3 we've previously had this argument, earlier this week. 
4 I did look at the advi—at the notes that Ms. Romero 
5 provided. Those date back to 1994. One of my arguments would 
6 be that the Spry case is more recent than that, and that right 
7 now, what we have is the Court of Appeals decision. Until the 
8 Supreme Court decides to do something with that, that is the 
9 controlling law on the courts in this State. 
10 I think that we've already gone over what the good 
11 cause is. The good cause is that we have a right to be 
12 prepared for trial, to be able to know if witnesses that Ms. 
13 Romero is going to call, whether we can impeach them, if they 
14 have prior criminal histories, there's many reasons, we would 
15 want to know any exhibits or things that she's going to 
16 introduce at trial. 
17 I think it's reasonable, although her case is mostly 
18 rebuttal, if she knows certain witnesses she's going to call 
19 or reasonably going to call, I think we have the right to that 
20 information. 
21 The—the State's position is, it's not a trial by 
22 ambush anymore, that we—we do have a right to find out some 
23 of this information. 
24 In looking at the—the documents that Ms. Romero 
25 provided, I don't think it tells us anything. I think that 
1 this is a political process that goes on. If you look at the-
2 -the people who are present, I think you have quite a few 
3 defense attorneys or defense-minded people and quite a few 
4 I prosecution-minded people who will probably never agree on 
5 this issue. And they're each staking their claim and putting 
6 their positions out there. 
7 So, under State v. Spry, the State feels that we are 
8 entitled to the information sought in that discovery request. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Would you point out to me— 
10 MS. ROMERO: Sure. 
11 THE COURT: —any particulars in this comments that 
12 you think are pertinent, because I'm not going to have a 
13 chance to—to read through them. 
14 MS. ROMERO: Okay. Okay. All right. 
15 THE COURT: And I'd like to resolve this today if we 
16 can do it. 
17 MS. ROMERO: Well, Judge, some of the things that I 
18 think are important that I've submitted to the Court with 
19 respect to these committee meeting notes—is that what you're 
20 referring to? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MS. ROMERO: If you'll look through them, these are 
23 just minutes, they're from 1993 and 1994 and what I've 
24 submitted to the Court were the most relevant portions and I 
25 think this was one of the last times that this issue was 
really hotly debated. 
It includes a proposal draft and it's toward the end 
of your packet and it's dated in the upper right-hand corner, 
the date of July 28th of 1993. And essentially, if you run 
through that, there seems to—there was a proposal that was 
submitted for modification of Rule 16 and this goes through 
and explains the— 
THE COURT: Is that— 
MS. ROMERO: —the different— 
THE COURT: Is that modification in here? 
MS. ROMERO: It was never mod—in terms of Rule 16? 
I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: No, is—is the draft that—that you've 
indicated or identified— 
MS. ROMERO: Yes. 
THE COURT: —is that modification in this draft? 
MS. ROMERO: Yes, Judge. The—the— 
THE COURT: Where is it? 
MS. ROMERO: What I'm referring to specifically is 
the reciprocal discovery and if you look at the draift, it goes 
through and it includes those particular items. It says 
disclosure by the defendant under Subsection B. 
THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
MS. ROMERO: And it goes through and requires all of 
these things to be disclosed, anything specifically that the 
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1 State is asking for* 
2 And I understand that we're dealing with the Spry 
3 case, I don't think the Spry case necessarily addressed all 
4 the issues that I'm raising today, however,— 
5 THE COURT: I don't know that it did. 
6 MS. ROMERO: —in terms of work product or privilege 
7 and essentially, making me an adversary against my own client. 
8 Moreover, there's one additional issue that I'd like 
9 to address, which is the State cites to this Williams versus 
10 Florida decision out of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1970 
11 requiring defense to give notice of alibi witnesses. I think 
12 when we're dealing with alibi witnesses, that's a whole 
13 different issue. We have a specific provision dealing with 
14 alibi witnesses and the reason why it's different is because 
15 that is a specific day and a specific time and that's very 
16 easy. That information essentially would dissolve the State's 
17 case, if it turned out to be in fact a legitimate alibi. 
18 That's the reason for the disclosure, is that is an absolute 
19 bar to a prosecution for an offense on that particular date 
20 and there's an understanding as to why that information would 
21 be necessary. 
22 Their investigator goes out, the officer or the 
23 detective goes out and confirms whether or not this particular 
24 person was at the particular place at that particular time. 
25 That completely rules that person out as a suspect in that 
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1 case and it eliminates the case, at least as to that 
2 particular defendant. 
3 The remaining items that are requested by the State 
4 in this case don't do the same thing. Essentially, they're 
5 saying we're going forward to trial, we want to be able to 
6 know what the State—or what the defense is going to present 
7 as evidence so that we can refute that. And it's—that's all 
8 well and good, I understand that as a position, I understand 
9 that there's some fundamental fairness that everybody, I 
10 think, sympathizes with on that position, but the bottom line 
11 is, this is not the place where we have a level playing field 
12 and where there's an anticipation that everybody should be on 
13 equal footing. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. I—I don't disagree with that. 
15 We have gone through this before. I've done considerable look 
16 at it and I'm—I'm willing to refine my views of this as we go 
17 along. I think it's important issue; but the issue here has 
18 to do with—with fairness, with issues of delay and—and not 
19 simply economy. And I think those—those are all good issues 
20 that—that do have to be balanced in a way that it doesn't 
21 interfere with the Constitutional rights and with work 
22 product. I agree with that. I don't think those are things 
23 that have been overcome in any of the—any of the research 
24 that I've done. 
25 But I am faced with the Spry case which certainly on 
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its face says that the current Rule 16(c) does provide for the 
court to have discretion to order just such disclosures as 
have been requested here, that is, discretion; that is, I 
don't—certainly didn't say that I'm mandated to do that in 
any particular case and I don't feel that I am. But I also 
think that they have shown that—that this is all within the 
scope and that the only showing that needs to be made of—is 
materiality. And that's made once we're talking about the 
intention to call at trial. 
So, I am going to grant the State's motion with 
these conditions: I'll grant number one, and I will say the— 
the cases that I have read, and I agree, tend to—to balance 
things on the intent to call at trial. 
Now, this is always a difficulty, especially in 
criminal cases, to know what that means. It's a good—if you 
have a good faith intent to call that witness at trial at this 
point, then you need to disclose this information. 
If it is a—a purely rebuttal witness, that is, that 
you cannot anticipate until you actually hear the testimony, 
and I—and I understand that's true about every single witness 
and I recognize that argument can be made and that's why I'm 
putting a good faith provision on it; if you can anticipate 
based on—on a good faith look at the case, that you will call 
a particular witness, then you need to reveal it. 
If it is a—an impeach—a true impeachment or 
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1 rebuttal witness, that is that you would not call unless 
2 testimony goes in a—in a—in alternative directions that you 
3 can't anticipate at this point, then you do not have to reveal 
4 that witness until that intent is formed. 
5 If during the trial, you see that you're going to 
6 call that witness, then you must reveal the name of that 
7 witness and give any information that you have about prior 
8 criminal history to the prosecution at that time. 
9 MS. ROMERO: And Judge, I have no access whatsoever 
10 to any witness' prior criminal history. The State has all 
11 that information. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Then you won't have any problem 
13 with that. 
14 MS. ROMERO: No. 
15 THE COURT: And—and so hopefully, that'LI never 
16 come up. 
17 MS. ROMERO: Right. 
18 THE COURT: But you'll need to give them the name as 
19 soon as you know and I will consider giving reasonable time 
20 for the State to— 
21 MS. ROMERO: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: —to prepare for those witnesses. So, 
23 in some sense, I—I think that what you're asking is 
24 appropriate. I do not want to—to put you in a position of 
25 disadvantage in terms of these kinds of issues. 
12 
I—I don't know that I've made myself clear enough 
or not. 
MS. ROMERO: No. 
THE COURT: The same things for copies of physical 
evidence, documents, any exhibits that you intend to—to 
enter, same kind of qualification. Any reports or conclus— 
are you intending to call any experts? 
MS. ROMERO: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's skip that then. 
MS. ROMERO: And I think that—we believe there is— 
under Title 76 or 77 of the Utah Code Annotated, I'm required 
to provide that notice 30 days prior to trial in any event. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Number four, are you intending to call any defense 
investigators at this point? 
MS. ROMERO: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll skip that. 
Number five, also. 
Okay. The—the—any statements that you have—we've 
talked about the timing on which you have to reveal—disclose 
the identity of witnesses. Any factual statements that you 
have from those witnesses, whether they prepare it or whether 
someone else prepared notes or statements for them, to the 
extent they're factual and are not opinions, impressions or 
that kind of thing, but simply notes or statements of those 
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1 witnesses, you'll need to—to disclose them or provide them on 
2 the time table that we just talked about. 
3 MS, ROMERO: Okay. I'm objecting to that, 
4 specifically, Judge—your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MS. ROMERO: The State never has to do that for us. 
7 We never get that kind of statement from their witnesses, we 
8 have to— 
9 THE COURT: So, are we back to reciprocal discovery 
10 at this time? 
11 MS. ROMERO: Well, I—the issue that I have at this 
12 point is essentially that we are never entitled to that type 
13 of information up front. We go to a preliminary hearing— 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Well, tell me about that then. 
15 MS. ROMERO: We go to a preliminary hearing, whoever 
16 they opt to call at the preliminary hearing, we get their 
17 statements on the record— 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, this isn't a preliminary 
19 I hearing. Tell— 
20 MS. ROMERO: I— 
21 THE COURT: —tell me about trial. 
22 MS. ROMERO: I understand that. I essentially wonft 
23 know what some of their witnesses are going to say until they 
24 put them on the stand because the only thing I have is a 
25 police report. 
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THE COURT: 
have taken statements 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
that. 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. ROMERO: 
THE COURT: 
point. 
MS. ROMERO: 
MS. TANGARO 
1 a*-"" 
THE COURT: 
witness disclosure at-
MS. ROMERO: 
information, I will. 
Judge, I al' 
Well, no. What I'm saying is, is if you 
from witnesses— 
Okay. I—okay. I have not. J 
If you have them in possession— 
No. 
—you do not have to create anything— 
Okay. That was my— 
—you do not have to do anything like 
Okay. 
Okay. 
Sorry. 
It's existing material. 
Sorry. 
All right. And that's the order at this 
Okay. 
: And then on No. 7, your Honor, there's 
Okay. Provide that information with the 
—at the time that it's appropriate then. 
Sure. And if I—if I know that 
Obviously, if I don't, I—I can't. 
so had a supplemental motion for 
discovery that has not yet been dealt with and it should be in 
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